"How do you teach logic? The early Husserl’s logic as Wissenschaftslehre"
"How not to globalize philosophy"
(Co-authored with Wiebke Denecke.) Is non-Western philosophy really philosophy? Most proponents of non-Western philosophy are disinclined to engage with this question very deeply. They urge that we refrain from much navel-gazing about what philosophy is and instead just notice how non-Western sources already satisfy much of our existing, intuitive criteria for what passes as philosophy. However, this essay argues that we cannot let this way of engaging the question of non-Western philosophy be the dominant mode of engagement. We really do need to examine our intuitions and prevailing ideologies about what philosophy even is; they are the whole problem. We do not need our going concept of ‘philosophy’ to be recognized as having a wider extension; we need our going concept of philosophy to change and transform, in light of its increasingly plain provincialism.
You and I experience things around us. We see tables and chairs and smell burnt toast. Yet we experiencers, you and I, are people, too: we make marks and noises saying ‘we’, ‘you’, and ‘I.’ And with these marks and noises happen everything humanly possible—playing tag, waging wars, burying brothers, and avoiding love. Does our ability to experience depend on our ability to express a human standpoint? Does our ability to express a human standpoint, moreover, depend on our ability to experience?
My research investigates this question of mutual dependence by study of two philosophical traditions: East Asian philosophy, and phenomenology.
My research is thus historical in focus. But two features distinguish the sort of historically-focused work I do. First, a growing body of work in the analytic tradition drawing on Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel informs my philosophical sense of what is at stake in phenomenology and East Asian philosophy. Second, I believe that a philosopher is someone who, at their best, illuminates how thinking and knowledge-creation happen in the arts, sciences, and ordinary life. For this reason, my work strives to be sensitive and responsive to how the arts and humanities, the cognitive and social sciences, and the many lineages of thinking philosophically explore, problematize, and conceptualize the issues I investigate.
Husserl's Philosophical Logic
My dissertation elucidates Husserl’s concept of philosophical logic. I argue that, for Husserl, philosophical logic is the account of what science and truth are, and that phenomenology and philosophical logic are thereby identical. I thus clarify two issues interpreters have yet to clarify adequately: first, why phenomenology, in all its concern for lived-experience and the first-person, is not psychology but philosophy; second, why ‘logic’ and ‘logical’ so often grace the titles of Husserl’s phenomenological works. By clarifying these issues, I exhibit anew why we need Husserl in our stories of philosophy’s 19th and 20th centuries.